Abstract. We correct the double spend race analysis given in Nakamoto's foundational Bitcoin article and give a closed-form formula for the probability of success of a double spend attack using the Regularized Incomplete Beta Function. We give a proof of the exponential decay on the number of confirmations, often cited in the literature, and find an asymptotic formula. Larger number of confirmations are necessary compared to those given by Nakamoto. We also compute the probability conditional to the known validation time of the blocks. This provides a finer risk analysis than the classical one.
Introduction.
The main breakthrough in [7] is the solution to the double spend problem. Before this discovery no one knew how to avoid the double spending of an electronic currency unit without the supervision of a central authority. This made Bitcoin the first form of peer-to-peer (P2P) electronic currency.
A double spend attack can only be attempted with a substantial fraction of the hashrate used in the Proof-of-Work of the Bitcoin network. The attackers will start a double spend race against the rest of the network to replace the last blocks of the blockchain by secretly mining an alternate blockchain. The last section of [7] computes the probability that the attackers catch up. However Nakamoto's analysis is not accurate since he makes the simplifying assumption that honest miners validate blocks at the expected rate. We present a correct analysis and give a closed-form formula for the exact probability. Theorem 1. Let 0 < q < 1/2, resp. p = 1 − q, the relative hash power of the group of the attackers, resp. of honest miners. After z blocks have been validated by the honest miners, the probability of success of the attackers is P (z) = I 4pq (z, 1/2) ,
where I x (a, b) is the Regularized Incomplete Beta Function
In general, for z ≥ 2, these probabilities P (z) are larger than those P SN (z) obtained by Nakamoto. From the standpoint of bitcoin security, this shows than larger confirmation times z are necessary compared to those z SN given by Nakamoto, in particular this happens when the share of hashrate q of the attackers is important. The following table shows the number z of confirmations to wait compared to those z SN given by Nakamoto for an attacking hashrate of 10% (or q = 0.1) and a probability of success of the attackers less than 0.1%. Nakamoto claims in [7] that the probability P (z) tends exponentially to 0 with z. This result is intuitively expected and cited at large but we were not able to find a proof in the literature. We give here a rigorous proof of this result. More precisely we give precise asymptotics both for P SN (z) and P (z) showing the exponential decay.
Theorem 2. When z → +∞ we have , with s = 4pq < 1,
and with λ = q/p, and c(λ) = λ − 1 − log λ > 0,
We can check that − log s > c(λ) which means that P SN (z) ≺ P (z) for z large.
A finer risk analysis.
We analyze a new parameter in the risk of a double spend. The probability of success of the attackers increases with the time τ 1 it takes to validate the z transactions since they have more time to secretly mine their alternate blockchain. On the other hand the task of the attackers is more difficult if the validations happen faster than the expected time. The value of τ 1 is known, therefore what is really relevant is the conditional probability assuming τ 1 is known. We introduce the dimensionless parameter κ which measures the deviation from average time:
where t 0 is the average time of block validation by honest miners (t 0 = τ 0 /p, where τ 0 = 10 min for the Bitcoin network).
Probability of success as a function of κ with q = 0.1
We study the probability P (z, κ) of success of the attackers. We can recover the previous probabilities with the P (z, κ), 0 < κ < 1.
Theorem 3. We have P SN (z) = P (z, 1) , and
We give a closed-form formula for P (z, κ).
Theorem 4. We have
We find also the asymptotics for z → +∞ for different values of κ.
Theorem 5. We have for z → +∞,
(1) For 0 < κ < 1,
(2) For κ = 1,
(4) For κ = p/q, P (z, p/q) → 1/2 and
(5) For p/q < κ, P (z, κ) → 1 and
Using a concavity argument we show that P (1) ≤ P SN (1), but in general, for z ≥ z 0 , we have P SN (z) ≤ P (z). We do compute an explicit, non sharp, value z 0 for which this inequality holds: Theorem 6. Let z ∈ N. A sufficient condition for having P SN (z) < P (z) is z ≥ z 0 with z 0 = z * 0 being the smallest integer greater or equal to
We also provide a double entry tables of the P (z, κ) for different values of (q, κ) for z = 3 and z = 6. For a complete set of tables for z = 1, 2, . . . 9 of practical use we refer to the companion article [5] .
Mathematics of mining.
We review some basic results in probability ([3] vol.2, p.8 for background). The process of bitcoin mining consists of computing block header hashes changing a nonce 1 in order to find a hash below a predefined threshold, the difficulty [7] . At each new hash the work is started from scratch, therefore the random variable T measuring the time it takes to mine a block is memoryless, which means that for any t 1 , t 2 > 0
Therefore we have
. This equation and a continuity argument determines the exponential function and implies that T is an exponentially distributed random variable:
for some parameter α > 0, the mining speed,
If (T 1 , . . . , T n ) is a sequence of independent identically distributed exponential random variables (for example T k is the mining time of the k-th block), then the sum
is a random variable following a gamma density with parameters (n, α) (obtained by convolution of the exponential density):
and cumulative distribution
We define the random process N (t) as the number of mined blocks at time t. Setting S 0 = 0, we have
Since N (t) = n is equivalent to S n ≤ t and S n+1 > t we get
which means that N (t) has a Poisson distribution with expectation αt.
Mining race.
We consider the situation described in section 11 of [7] (p.9) where a group of attacker miners attempts a double spend attack. The attacker group has a fraction 0 < q < 1/2 of the total hash rate, and the rest, the honest miners, has a fraction p = 1 − q. Thus the probability that the attackers find the next block is q while the probability for the honest miners is p. Nakamoto computes the probability for the attackers to catch up when z blocks have been mined by the honest group. In general to replace the chain mined by the honest miners and succeed a double spend the attackers need to mine z + 1 blocks, i.e. to mine a longer chain. In the analysis it is assumed that we are not near an update of the difficulty which remains constant 2 .
The first discussion in section 11 of [7] is about computing the probability q z of the attacker catching up when they lag by z blocks behind the honest miners. The analysis is correct and is similar to the Gamblers Ruin problem. We review it.
Lemma 3.1. Let q n be the probability of the event E n , "catching up from n blocks behind". We have
Proof. We have q 0 = 1, q 1 = q/p, and by the Markov property
thus q n = q n 1 and the result follows.
Note that after one more block has been mined, we have for n ≥ 1,
and the only solution to this recurrence with q 0 = 1 and q n → 0 is q n = (q/p) n .
We consider the random variables T and S n , resp. T and S n , associated to the group of honest, resp. attacker, miners. And also consider the random Poisson process N (t), resp. N (t). The random variables T and T are clearly independent and have exponential distributions with parameters α and α . We have
Moreover, inf(T , T ) is an exponentially distributed random variable with parameters α + α which represents the mining speed of the entire network, honest and attacker miners together. The Bitcoin protocol is calibrated such that α + α = τ 0 with τ 0 = 10 min. So we have
These results can also be obtained in the following way. The hash function used in bitcoin block validation is h(x) = SHA256(SHA256(x)). The hashrate is the number of hashes per second performed by the miners. At a stable hashrate regime, the average time it takes to validate a block by the network is τ 0 = 10 min. If the difficulty is set to be d ∈ (0, 2 256 − 1], we validate a block when h(BH) < d, where BH is the block header. The pseudo-random output of SHA256 shows that we need to compute an average number of m = 2 256 /d hashes to find a solution. Let h, resp. h , be the hashrates of the honest miners, resp. the attackers. The total hashrate of the network is h + h , and we have
Let t 0 , resp. t 0 , be the average time it takes to validate a block by the honest miners, resp. the attackers. We have
and from this we get that τ 0 is half the harmonic mean of t 0 and t 0 ,
and also
Going back to the Poisson distribution parameters, we have
and we recover the relations
Nakamoto's analysis.
Once the honest miners mine the z-th block, the attackers have mined k blocks with a probability computed in the next section (Proposition 5.1). If k > z, then the attackers chain is adopted and the attack succeeds. Otherwise the probability they catch up is (q/p) z as computed above, therefore the probability P of success of the attack is
Then Nakamoto makes the simplifying assumption that the blocks have been mined according to average expected time per block. This is asymptotically true when z → +∞ but false otherwise. More precisely, he approximates N (S z ) by N (t z ) where
As we have seen above, the random variable N (t z ) follows a Poisson distribution with parameter
The final calculus in [7] is then
However, this analysis is not correct since N (S z ) = N (t z ).
The correct analysis.
Let X n = N (S n ) be the number of blocks mined by the attackers when the honest miners have just mined the n-th block. We compute the distribution for X n .
Proposition 5.1. The random variable X n has a negative binomial distribution with parameters (n, p), i.e. for k ≥ 0,
Proof. Let k ≥ 0. We have that N and S n are independent, therefore
Thus we confirm that the distribution of X n is not a Poisson law with parameter nq/p as claimed by Nakamoto. Only asymptotically we have a convergence to the Poisson distribution: Proposition 5.2. In the limit n → +∞, q → 0, and l n = nq/p → λ we have:
Proof. We have
and the result follows using 1 + ln n n → e λ .
We can now compute the probability of success of the attackers catching up a longer chain. This computation was previously done in [8] .
Proposition 5.3. (Probability of success of the attackers) The probability of success by the attackers after z blocks have been mined by the honest miners is
Proof. As explained before, we have Converting to R code, given 0 < q < 1/2 and z ≥ 0, this simple function computes our probability P (z):
for (k in 0:(z-1)) {sum=sum-(p^z*q^k-q^z*p^k)*choose(k+z-1,k)} ; return(sum) } We can compare with the probability P SN computed in [7] . Therefore the correct results for bitcoin security are worse than those given in [7] . The explanation is that Nakamoto's result is correct only if the mining time by the honest miners is exactly the expected time. Longer than average times help the attackers.
6. Closed-form formula.
We give a closed-form formula for P (z) using the regularized incomplete beta function I x (a, b) (see [1] (6.6.2)).
Theorem 6.1. We have, with s = 4pq,
We recall that the incomplete beta function is defined (see [1] (6.6.1)), for a, b > 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, by
and the classical beta function is defined (see
The Regularized Incomplete Beta Function is defined (see [1] (6.6.2) and (26.5.1)) by
Proof. The cumulative distribution of a random variable X with negative binomial distribution, with 0 < p < 1 and q = 1 − p as usual (see [1] (26.5.26))) is given by
This results from the formula (see [1] (6.6.1))
that we prove by integrating by parts the definition of B x (a, b).
Thus we get
Making the change of variables t → 1 − t in the integral definition, we also have a symmetry relation (see [1] (6.6.3))
Therefore we have I p (z, z) + I q (z, z) = 1, and P (z) = 2I q (z, z). The result follows using (see [1] (26.5.14)), I q (z, z) = 1 2 I s (z, 1/2), where s = 4pq.
7. Asymptotic and exponential decay.
Nakamoto makes the observation ( [7] p.8), without proof, that the probability decreases exponentially to 0 when z → +∞. We prove this fact for the true probability P (z) using the closed-form formula from Proposition 6.1, Proposition 7.1. When z → +∞ we have, with s = 4pq < 1,
By integration by parts we get the following elementary version of Watson's Lemma:
Then we get the following asymptotics (see also [6] ):
Lemma 7.3. For s, b ∈ R, we have when z → +∞,
Proof. Making the change of variable u = log(s/t) in the definition
and the result follows applying Lemma 7.2 with f (u) = (1 − se
Now we end the proof of Proposition 7.1. By Stirling asymptotics,
A finer risk analysis.
In practice, in order to avoid a double spend attack, the recipient of the bitcoin transaction waits for z ≥ 1 confirmations. But he also has the information on the time τ 1 it took to confirm the transaction z times. Obviously the probability of success of the attackers increases with τ 1 . The relevant parameter is the relative deviation from the expected time
Our purpose is to compute the probability P (z, κ) of success of the attackers. Note that P (z, 1) is the probability computed by Nakamoto [7] , P SN (z) = P (z, 1) .
Computation of P (z, κ).
The attackers mined k ≥ 0 blocks during the time τ 1 with probability that follows a Poisson distribution with parameter
For κ = 1 we recover Nakamoto's approximation.
The cumulative Poisson distribution can be computed with the incomplete regularized gamma function ([1] (26.4))
is the incomplete gamma function and Γ(s) = Γ(s, 0) is the regular gamma function. We have
We compute as before 9. Asymptotics of P (z, κ) and P SN (z).
We find the asymptotics of Q(z, λz) when z → +∞ for different values of λ > 0.
Lemma 9.1. We have
Proof.
(1) By [2] (8.11.6) and Stirling formula,for λ < 1 we have
(2) Also by [2] (8.11.12) and Stirling formula,
.7) and Stirling formula,for λ > 1 we have
For x > 0 we define c(x) = x − 1 − log x, which is positive since the graph of x → 1 − x is the tangent at x = 1 to the concave graph of the logarithm function. We denote 0 < λ = q/p < 1.
We have that the Nakamoto probability P SN (z) also decreases exponentially with z as claimed by Nakamoto in [7] without proof. Proposition 9.2. We have for z → +∞,
Proof. The result follows from the closed-form formula from Theorem 7,
and then from points (1) and (2) More generally, we have five different regimes for the asymptotics of P (z, κ) for 0 < κ < 1, κ = 1, 1 < κ < p/q, κ = p/q and κ > p/q. Proposition 9.3. We have for z → +∞,
(1) If κ < 1 then also κq/p < 1, and 
Since Q(z, κz) → 1 we have,
(2) This was proved in Proposition 9.2.
(3) When 1 < κ < p/q then by Lemma 9.1,
So we have
(4) The previous asymptotic at the start of the proof of (3) is also valid for 1 < κ = p/q and gives
and by Lemma 9.1,
(5) For κ > p/q we use again the same asymptotic of (3) to get
and again
10. Comparing asymptotics of P (z) and P SN (z).
We have an asymptotic comparison, Proposition 10.1. We have for z → +∞,
Proof. Note that
So with s = 4pq < 1 we have
and for z large
As we will see later we can be more explicit about the inequality between P SN (z) and P (z).
11. Recovering P (z) from P (z, κ).
We have seen above that P SN (z) can be recover from P (z, κ) by taking the value at κ = 1. It turns out that we can also recover P (z) as a weighted average on κ of P (z, κ).
Theorem 8. We have
with the density function
We check that
We can write
where
Then the Theorem follows from a direct computation,
We give a second more conceptual proof.
Proof. Consider the random variable
We have seen above that S z ∼ Γ(z, α) so κ ∼ Γ(z, α zτ 0 p ) = Γ(z, z). So the density dρ z is the distribution of κ. It is enough to prove that
We have
And by conditioning by S z we get
We also note that E[κ] = 1.
Range of κ.
The probability to observe a deviation greater than κ is P[κ > κ] with κ = p zτ 0 S z . We have that κ follows a Γ-distribution, κ ∼ Γ(z, z), so
Then, by Lemma 9.1,
e −zc(κ) for κ > 1. Note that this probability does not depend on p. For z = 6, we have P[κ > 4] ≈ 3 · 10 −6 and for z = 10,
. So, in practice, the probability to have κ > 4 is very unlikely. Below, we have represented the graph of κ −→ P (z, κ) for different values of z (q = 0.1) and 0 < κ < 4. We see that κ −→ P (z, κ) is convex in the range of values of κ considered. We study the convexity in more detail in the next section. This is a polynomial equation in 1/κ, the coefficients are increasing on z, and the left hand side is decreasing on κ ∈ (0, +∞) from +∞ to 0, therefore there is a unique solution κ(z), and κ(2) < κ(3) < . . .
We compute
In this case the function κ → P (z, κ) is convex only in the interval (0, κ(z)). For z large, most of the support of the measure dρ z is contained in this interval and we have by Jensen's inequality
We can get some estimates on κ(z) for z → +∞. The first observation is that for z large we have κ(z) > 1. The asymptotic limits for Q(z, κz) for κ < 1 and κ = 1 (Lemma 9.1) and Stirling asymptotic formula give that Q(z, κz)z!e κz (zκ) z → +∞ , and g λ,z (κ) = 0.
For κ > 1, we can use the asymptotic [2] (8.11.7), z → +∞,
we have
we have g λ,∞ (κ ∞ ) = 0, so we get:
This upper bound is quite sharp in view of the asymptotics in Proposition 9.3 (2).
Lemma 15.2. Let z ∈ N * and λ ∈ R *
Proof. For (1) We use [2] (8.7.1)
16. Comparing again P SN (z) and P (z).
The aim of this section is to compute an explicit rank z 0 (no sharp) for which P SN (z) < P (z) for z ≥ z 0 .
x − α and g (3) (x) = e x . So, g(log α) = g (log α) = g (log α) = 0 and g (3) > 0. Therefore, g(x) > 0 for x > log α.
Lemma 16.2. For α > 0 and x > 1 + 1/ √ 2 log α we have e x > αx.
Proof. The inequality is trivial when x ≤ 0. So, we can assume that x > 0. For 0 < α < 1, we have e x > x > αx. For 1 < α < e, by Lemma 16.1, we have e x − αx > 0 for x > log α. For α > e, the largest root of the polynomial α 2 (x − log α) 2 + α(1 − log α) is log α + 2(log α − 1) which is smaller than (1 + 1/ √ 2) log α since 2(u − 1) ≤ u/ √ 2 for u ≥ 1. So, the inequality results from Lemma 16.1 again.
⇐⇒ e 2ψ·(x+1/2) > 1 2ψµ 2 e −ψ , 2ψ · (x + 1/2) By Lemma 16.2, the last inequality is satisfied as soon as
Moreover, we have
Theorem 16.4. Let z ∈ N. A sufficient condition for having P SN (z) < P (z) is z ≥ z 0 with z 0 = z * 0 being the smallest integer greater or equal to
Proof. First, note that
So, ψ(p) > 0 and z 0 is well defined. Let z > z 0 . By Lemma 14.2 and Corollary 15.1 it is enough to prove that
. So, the inequality is satisfied as soon
and the result follows from Lemma 16.3.
The sharp values are numerically computed and given in the table below: Table for P (6, κ) (z = 6) for different values of κ and q in %. 
